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Purpose In this experiment we examined whether an unanticipated spatial task could increase 
the differences between lying and truth telling groups of children. In addition, we explored 
whether there are some elements of such a spatial task that elicit more diagnostic cues to 
deception than others. 
Methods In groups of three, children (N = 150, aged 13-14) either experienced (‘truth tellers’) 
or imagined (‘liars’) an event. In subsequent individual interviews, the children were asked to 
provide both a general verbal description of the event (the anticipated task), and a spatial 
description by making marks on a sketch (the unanticipated task). Next, adults (N = 200) rated 
the degree of consistency between either the general descriptions or the spatial descriptions 
from the children in each triad. 
Results No differences between liars and truth tellers were found when the interview task was 
anticipated (general verbal descriptions). In contrast, when the interview task was 
unanticipated (spatial markings), statements from truth telling triads were perceived as 
significantly more consistent than those of lying triads. Importantly, as predicted, the 
difference between lying and truth-telling triads only emerged for markings of salient (vs. 
non-salient) aspects of the event. 
Conclusions The results suggests that (a) using spatial tasks may be a useful tool for detecting 
deception in children, but that (b) the assessment of credibility should only draw on the salient 
aspects of the unanticipated task.  
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Although children often appear innocent, they do lie and can do it convincingly (Vrij, 
2002). There are only a few studies on adults’ ability to detect children’s lies, and the results 
show that their ability is only just above chance level (e.g., Jackson & Granhag, 1997; Vrij, 
2008). Further, many crimes are committed in groups (van Mastrigt & Farrington, 2009), and 
children are more likely to commit crimes in groups than adults (Scott & Steinberg, 2008). 
Research on detecting lies in adults has found that lying pair members act differently 
compared to pairs of truth tellers (Driskell, Salas, Driskell, in press; Vrij et al., in press). Still, 
when it comes to detecting deception in children, most research published to date has used 
statements from single children only. To remedy these shortcomings, the present experiment 
focused on how to elicit cues to deception in groups of children.   
Research has shown that, if the situation allows, observers often use the cue of statement 
consistency. There are at least four different forms of consistency. First, one may examine the 
consistency between the statement and other available evidence (Clemens et al., 2010).  
Second, if the statement is of sufficient length and substance, one can examine consistency or 
contradictions within the statement (e.g., Landström, Roos af Hjelmsäter, & Granhag, 2007). 
Third, suspects are most often interviewed repeatedly, allowing observers to examine 
inconsistencies between different statements (e.g., Granhag & Strömwall, 2001). Fourth, if 
there is more than one suspect, statements from different persons could be compared for 
consistency (e.g., Strömwall, Granhag, & Jonsson, 2003).  
Both legal workers (Strömwall & Granhag, 2003) and lay persons (Granhag & Strömwall, 
2000) appear to use the consistency cue, and assume that consistency implies truth and 
inconsistency implies deception. However, previous research has shown that deceptive 
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statements can be equally or even more consistent than truthful statements (Granhag, 
Strömwall, & Jonsson, 2003; Wagenaar & Dalderop, 1994). To explain this finding, Granhag 
and Strömwall (1999) introduced the so-called ‘repeat vs. reconstruct’ hypothesis. The 
hypothesis states that when interviewed repeatedly, the statements of liars will show a 
relatively high degree of repetition, as liars will try hard to remember what they have said in 
previous interviews. In addition, the hypothesis assumes that liars will be careful not to 
introduce new information in later statements. In contrast, the hypothesis predicts that truthful 
statements will follow the basic principles of ‘reconstructive memory’ (e.g., Baddeley, 1990), 
and therefore show a natural variation over repeated interviews. That is, some details will be 
lost and some details will be added. In essence, the ‘repeat’ part of the hypothesis was 
assumed to hold true for deceptive statements, whereas the ‘reconstruct’ part was assumed to 
hold true for truthful statements. Research has shown empirical support for this hypothesis 
(e.g., Granhag & Strömwall, 2001; Granhag & Strömwall, 2002; Granhag et al., 2003).  
Co-offenders are aware of the importance of a planned story (e.g., Wagenaar & Dalderop, 
1994). Therefore, according to the repeat vs. reconstruct hypothesis, groups of liars may 
repeat what is agreed on and not introduce new information. This will result in relatively high 
consistency between statements of liars. In contrast, groups of truth-telling suspects will try to 
reconstruct the to-be-remembered event from their memory, resulting in some degree of 
inconsistency due to the natural malleability of memory.   
A new wave of research has shown that the ‘repeat vs. reconstruct’ hypothesis only holds 
true when liars and truth tellers are asked questions that are anticipated and when liars have 
planned their answers (e.g., Leins, Fisher, Vrij, Leal, & Mann, 2011; Vrij et al, 2009). For 
interviews including unanticipated elements the pattern of results is likely to be different. 
That is, for elements that are unanticipated, liars will not prepare a story, and thus 
inconsistencies may occur. Unanticipated elements can come in at least two different forms; 
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the question as such can be unanticipated (e.g., the suspect is asked for complications that 
occurred during the critical event) or the response format can be unanticipated (e.g., the 
suspect may be asked to draw a sketch of a room instead of providing a verbal description). In 
a recent study by Vrij and his colleagues (2009) these two unanticipated elements were 
combined. In this study pairs of liars and truth tellers were interviewed individually about an 
alleged visit to a restaurant. The conventional opening questions (e.g., “What did you do in 
the restaurant?”) were anticipated, whereas the request to sketch the layout of the restaurant 
was not. Based on the overlap in the two pair members’ sketches (consistency), 80% of the 
liars and truth tellers were classified correctly (the sketches were less alike for the pairs of 
liars than pairs of truth tellers), whereas on the basis of the conventional questions the pairs 
were not classified above chance level (for more on this, see Vrij, Granhag & Porter, 2010).  
These findings thus suggest that spatial questions are unanticipated, and therefore they 
may be an effective lie detection tool. As drawings are a suitable way to examine spatial 
questions, the present experiment used a similar distinction as Vrij et al. (2009); general 
verbal questions vs. spatial drawings. In addition, the present experiment also examined 
whether it is the spatial drawing task per se that is effective, or whether some elements of 
such a spatial task are more diagnostic than others. We are not aware of any study to date that 
has explored this, and one aim of the present experiment was therefore to generate more 
detailed knowledge about the effectiveness of different aspects of the unanticipated spatial 
task. 
The unanticipated question approach applies to liars’ statements, predicting a variation in 
consistency due to an ‘expectancy effect’. However, one might also expect differences in 
consistency for truth tellers. Salient aspects of an event will attract more attention and 
therefore be better remembered. Thus, for such aspects, truth tellers can draw on their 
memory and their statement are likely to be relatively consistent. On the contrary, non-salient 
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aspects of an event that attracts less attention will result in poorer memory. Therefore, for 
non-salient aspects inconsistency between statements can be expected also for truth tellers. 
Thus, the degree of consistency between truthful statements may vary due to natural ‘memory 
effects’. We believe that it is important to consider the interaction between expectancy effects 
and memory effects.  In the present experiment we explored whether the degree of saliency 
moderates the effectiveness of a spatial drawing task.  
 
The Present Experiment 
Previous research has studied how to detect deceit in pairs of children (Strömwall & 
Granhag, 2007), and the unanticipated question approach has shown promising results with 
children who lie individually (Liu et al., 2010). The present experiment extends previous 
research by combining these two elements. Specifically, we examined if an unanticipated 
spatial task could increase the differences between deceptive and truthful statements from 
groups of children. In addition, we sought to further explore the spatial task by including 
markings that varied in terms of saliency.  
In the present study children acted in groups of three (triads). Half of the triads met and 
interacted with a man, and they later told the truth about this meeting. The remaining triads 
made up that they had met a man. Hence, in the interview they lied about the encounter. All 
children were then interviewed individually about the encounter. The interview included a 
general verbal task (the anticipated task) and a non-verbal spatial task (the unanticipated task).  
First, we predicted that the liars would perceive the spatial task as more difficult than 
would the truth-tellers (Hypothesis 1). Further in line with the unanticipated question 
approach (e.g., Vrij et al., 2009; Vrij, Leal, et al., 2010) we hypothesized that differences 
between liars and truth tellers would be larger when the task was unanticipated (vs. 
anticipated). That is, we expected liars’ and truth tellers’ general answers to be rated as 
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equally consistent, whereas, we expected the truth-tellers’ (vs. liars’) answers to be perceived 
as more consistent for the spatial task (Hypothesis 2). To qualify this further, we expected that 
the truth-tellers’ (vs. liars’) answers would be perceived as more consistent for the salient 
aspects, whereas we expected no differences between liars and truth-tellers for the non-salient 
aspects (Hypothesis 3).  
 
Method 
The present experiment consisted of two phases. In the first phase, children were 
interviewed about an event they had either participated in, or imagined, in groups of three. In 
the interview the children were first asked to provide a general verbal description of the event, 
and then a spatial description (markings on a sketch). In the second phase, adults assessed the 
level of consistency between the three children’s (a) verbal descriptions and (b) spatial 
markings.  
Phase One: The Children 
Participants. A total of 150 children (age = 13-14, 74 girls, 76 boys) from different 
schools in the Gothenburg area participated in the study. All children participated during a 
visit to the University of Gothenburg as a part of the International Science Festival in 
Gothenburg. Consent was collected from the parents as well as from the children.  
The event. The triad members knew each other, as they were in the same class in school. 
Some triads were same-sex and some were mixed. All children were instructed to imagine 
that they were late for their appointment at the department. They were told to blame the delay 
on an encounter with a man by a statue located just outside the department. Half of the triads 
went to this statue and when they were there, they actually met a man (the “truth tellers”). The 
remaining triads imagined the encounter (the “liars”). The triads were randomly allocated to 
”Mapping” children’s deception 
8 
 
either the lying condition or the truth-telling condition, and there were 25 groups in each 
veracity condition.  
Half of the triads (the truth tellers) were asked to go to the statue outside the department. 
While the children were at the statue, they were approach by a man (a stranger) who asked 
them about a missing girl. He showed a photo of the girl and asked the children if they had 
seen her. When the children answered truthfully that they had not seen her, he took the photo 
and walked away in the opposite direction. The man was instructed (and had rehearsed) to 
come from the same direction, ask the same question, show the photo in the same way, and 
walk away into the same direction in each encounter. The children then returned to the 
department. The entire event lasted a few minutes and was supervised from a window by an 
experimenter who made sure that the children walked up to the statue, as they were instructed. 
The children were then told that they would now be interview individually about the 
encounter and that it was important that they were believed by the interviewer. 
 The remaining 25 triads (the liars) did not go to the statue. Instead, they were shown the 
statue from a window. Thereafter they were told to imagine that they were late for the 
appointment because they had forgotten the time. To stay out of trouble, they decided to make 
up a story about why being late. The triads were told to pretend that they were at the statue 
where they encountered a man who asked them about, and showed them a picture of, a 
missing girl. They were told that they would later be interviewed about the encounter and 
were given five minutes together to prepare their story. They were semi-guided, as they were 
shown the location, but were asked to invent the man’s appearance and what he had said. 
They were instructed to try to convince the interviewer that they had met the man by the 
statue.  
The interviews. All children were then interviewed individually about the encounter. The 
six female interviewers all had previous experience in interviewing children and were blind to 
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the veracity condition of the children. The interview consisted of two phases; a general phase 
with verbal questions about the event, and a spatial phase in which the children were required 
to mark aspects of the event on a sketch. In the general phase, the children were asked a 
predefined set of six directed, but open-ended questions (e.g., What did the man ask you? 
What was he wearing?). In the subsequent spatial phase, the children were presented with a 
sketch of the location (the statue and the area around the statue) and asked to mark, in 
different colours, six spatial aspects of the event that differed in terms of saliency. As the man 
was the main focus of the event, aspects concerning the man (the man’s position and the 
man’s enter and exit direction) were defined as salient. The positions of the children (the 
child’s own position and the position of the two friends) were defined as non-salient aspects. 
Each interview was audio-recorded and lasted just a few minutes.  
The questionnaire. After the interview, all children were given a questionnaire in which 
they were asked to rate the interview in terms of anticipation and difficulty. For each of the 
general and spatial questions they were asked to indicate on a 5-point scale the extent to 
which they had expected the question (from 1 = “yes, definitely”, to 5 = “not at all”) and to 
what extent they found the question difficult to answer (from 1= “not difficult at all”, to 5 = 
“very difficult”). 
Phase Two: The Adults 
Participants. The adult participants were recruited at various departments at the 
University of Gothenburg. A total of 100 adults (47 % male, age 19-50, M = 23.92, SD = 
4.53) rated the verbal answers. Yet another set of 100 adults (28 % male, age 18-58, M = 
25.62, SD = 6.89) rated the markings. All volunteered to participate and without 
compensation. 
The consistency questionnaires. As background information, the adults were told that 
children, in groups of three, are claiming to have met a man outside the department. Whether 
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they are telling the truth or not is not known. They were also informed that each child had 
been interviewed individually. Each questionnaire contained either the transcripts of the 
general phase of the interviews from the three children in one group, or the six markings of 
the spatial phase from the three children in one group. Each questionnaire was made in two 
copies so that each one was rated by two adults. 
 In the questionnaires for the general descriptions, the adult’s task was to rate the degree 
of consistency between the three children’s statements on a 7-point scale (from 1 = “not at all 
consistent” to 7 = “completely consistent”). Separate ratings were first made for the four main 
interview questions, and finally, to include the perception of aspects that where not covered 
by these four questions, an overall rating was made (in total five ratings). 
 In the questionnaires for the spatial descriptions, the adults rated the degree of 
consistency between the three children for each marking task (in total six ratings) on a 7-point 




Manipulation check. An analysis of the children’s ratings showed that the spatial task 
was less anticipated (M = 3.75, SD = 1.11) than the general task (M = 1.91, SD = 0.67), t(137) 
= 19.65, p < 0.01, d = 2.02. This shows that the manipulation of anticipated/unanticipated 
tasks was successful.  
Difficulty. The children rated the spatial task as being more difficult (M = 2.24, SD = 
1.09) than the general task (M = 1.89, SD = 0.59), t(134) = 4.14, p < 0.01, d = 0.40. Moreover, 
in line with Hypothesis 1, liars rated the spatial task as being more difficult (M = 2.49, SD = 
1.30) than did truth tellers (M = 1.98, SD = 0.78), t(110.67) = 2.78, p < 0.01, d = 0.48. There 
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was no significant difference between liars’ (M = 1.87, SD = 0.67) and truth tellers’ difficulty 
ratings (M = 1.91, SD = 0.49) for the general task, t(127.52) = 0.42, p = 0.68, d = 0.07.  
 
The Adult’s Consistency Ratings  
General descriptions. To test whether veracity had an effect on the consistency ratings 
for the general phase, a MANOVA was conducted using the ratings of the five general 
descriptions as dependent variables. There was no significant main effect of Veracity, F(5, 
94) = 1.33, p = 0.26, ηp
2
= 0.07. Thus, in line with Hypothesis 2, the results showed that there 
was no difference in perceived consistency between liars’ and truth tellers’ general verbal 
answers. For a detailed description of the data, see Table 1. 
----- Insert Table 1 about here ----- 
 Spatial descriptions. For the ratings of the six spatial markings, a MANOVA showed a 
significant multivariate main effect of Veracity, F(6, 93) = 19.44, p < 0.001, ηp
2
 = 0.56. Truth 
tellers’ markings were rated as more consistent than the markings made by the liars (see Table 
2), supporting Hypothesis 2. Importantly, and as predicted, there was only a significant 
difference between liars and truth tellers for salient features. Univariate analyses showed that 
the truth tellers were perceived as more consistent than the liars for the markings of the 
position of the man [F(1,98) = 58.63, p < .001, ηp
2= 
.37 ], enter direction [F(1,98) = 32.32, p < 
.001, ηp
2= 
.24], and exit direction [F(1,98) = 37.13, p < .001, ηp
2= 
.27]. For non-salient features 
no significant differences were found, thus supporting Hypothesis 3. For a detailed 
description of the data, see Table 2. 
----- Insert Table 2 about here ----- 
 
Discussion 
The present experiment showed that the spatial task was unanticipated, and that this 
increased the differences between the statements of deceptive and truthful groups of children. 
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Importantly, the results also showed that only some aspects of the spatial task produced cues 
diagnostic for deception, and thus, it is important to consider the degree of saliency of the 
different aspects included in a spatial task. 
A substantial number of studies have shown that observers are poor at distinguishing 
deceptive from truthful accounts, from both adults and children (for a review see Bond & 
DePaulo, 2006). Hence, it is important to develop techniques that elicit cues that can be used 
to distinguish liars from truth-tellers. The present experiment used an unanticipated question 
approach to increase the differences in consistency between statements from groups of 
children. We used an interview that consisted of a general phase (the anticipated task), and a 
spatial phase (the unanticipated task). We found that the adults did not perceive any 
differences between liars and truth tellers in the anticipated task, which is in agreement with 
previous research showing that when participants have had the chance to prepare their 
statements, deceptive and truthful statements are similar in terms of consistency (Granhag et 
al., 2003; Strömwall & Granhag 2007). In contrast, when adults rated the consistency between 
children in the unanticipated marking task, differences between liars and truth tellers 
emerged, similar to what has been found by Vrij et al (2009) in their research with adults. The 
success of the unanticipated questions approach could be seen to be the result of ‘expectancy 
effects’. That is, inconsistencies emerge between liars’ statements because they do not expect, 
and thus not prepare for, the spatial questions. 
Previous research has found that some unanticipated tasks (i.e., spatial questions and 
drawing requests) elicit more diagnostic cues to deception than others (i.e., temporal 
questions) (e.g., Vrij et al., 2009). A related, but previously unexplored, question is whether 
there are some elements of a spatial task that are more diagnostic than other elements. The 
present experiment demonstrated that differences between liars and truth tellers emerged only 
for salient features of the event, that is, the man’s position and actions. These features were 
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central and constant during the event. Therefore, truth tellers may have had a good memory 
for these features, resulting in a comparatively high degree of consistency. However, as it was 
the man, and not the fellow children, that was the focus of the event, the children’s positions 
may have been less memorable. Thus, for these non-salient features the truth tellers’ 
statements were much more inconsistent. In other words, the consistency between truthful 
statements varied as a result of ‘memory effects’. At the same time, the consistency between 
deceptive statements remained constant (i.e., low, in accordance to the expectancy effect). 
Taken together, the results of the present experiment have important implications because 
they suggest that it is not just the spatial task per se that yields diagnostic cues to deception, 
but that some aspects of a spatial task (the description of salient features) are more useful than 
others in eliciting differences between liars and truth tellers.  
We have some suggestions for future studies within this area. First, in the present 
experiment the adult participants were asked to rate the consistency between the children’s 
statements. As previous research has found that observers are not always able to make use of 
existing objective cues to deception (Clemens et al., 2010), in future studies participants could 
also be asked to assess veracity directly. Second, the present experiment used a rather simple 
spatial task (to place markings on an existing sketch). Future studies may investigate if the 
results hold also for self-generated drawings.  
This experiment, as well as others (Strömwall & Granhag, 2007), show that children are 
skilled liars, in the sense that they are able to make up a good “cover story” even when they 
have only a short time to prepare. Thus, efficient methods are needed if one wants to detect 
children’s lies. The results of the present experiment, as well as previous research (Vrij, Leal, 
et al., 2010), suggest that spatial tasks may be a useful tool when assessing both adults’ and 
children’s lies. A key finding of the present experiment is that in order to be effective, salient 
aspects should be the focus of the spatial task. Overall, in order for the unanticipated question 
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method to be an effective lie-detection tool, it is important to find tasks that the liars have not 
anticipated, but the truth tellers have a good memory for.  
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Table 1. Mean scores (and standard deviations) of the adult’s rating of the level of agreement 
between the children’s general descriptions 
 Truth tellers Liars 
 M (SD) M (SD) 
1. The man’s intention 5.42 (1.51) 5.28 (1.31) 
2. The man’s appearance 4.32 (1.30) 4.34 (1.39) 
3. The man’s clothes 4.10 (1.09) 3.82 (1.59) 
4. The girl’s appearance 4.78 (1.17) 4.14 (1.68) 
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Table 2. Mean scores (and standard deviations) of the adult’s rating of the level of agreement 
between the children’s spatial markings 







 Truth tellers  Liars F(1, 98) p ηp
2
 
 M (SD)  M (SD)    
Non-salient features       
 Position of child 1 3.50  (1.45)   3.30 (1.50) .46 - -.01 
 Position of child 2 3.82 (1.41)  3.26 (1.45) 3.82 - .03 
 Position of child 3 
Salient features  
3.60 (1.43)  3.12 (1.42) 2.83 - .02 
 Position of the man 5.10 (1.15)     3.14 (1.40) 58.63 ** .37 
 Enter direction  4.48 (1.39)     2.78 (1.60) 32.32 ** .24 
 Exit direction 4.86 (1.65)     2.80 (1.73) 37.13 ** .27 
